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Abstract—With the rapid development of deep neural
networks (DNN), DNN-based face recognition technologies are
also achieving great success and have been widely used in
various applications requiring high-accuracy and robustness
against attacks. However, deep neural networks are known to
be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, performed using images
added with well-designed perturbations. To enhance security
of DNN-based face recognition, we need to know more about
mechanisms of relate technologies. In this paper, we propose a
feature-level supportive method, biasGAN, to improve the
performance of universal adversarial attack methods. We
insert this image to image translation preprocessor before
conducting adversarial examples generation. BiasGAN will
search in the potential face image space and can generate
images with biased face feature characteristics, causing
generated face images to be easier to perturb efficiently.
Experiment results show that this approach improves both
fooling ratio and average perturbation size significantly at
different perturbation levels.
Keywords—Deep neural networks, Generative adversarial
networks, Face recognition, Adversarial attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning, one of the hottest research topic in these
years, has been applied in various applications and achieved
great success, face recognition is one of those applications.
Deep neural networks (DNN) based high-accuracy face
recognition [1] is widely used in different areas such as
military, finance, public security and daily life applications.
With the appearance of adversarial examples [2], deep
neural networks show vulnerability when facing with
adversarial attacks, these well-designed inputs can easily fool
well-trained DNN model, DNN based face recognition also
can not survive from these adversarial samples.
Adversarial examples are first proposed by Szegedy et al.
[3], they reach the purpose of confusing the classification
model by adding almost imperceptible perturbations on the
original images, their result shows a model, even with high
classification accuracy, is also surprisingly susceptible to
slightly modified images. After that, research about
adversarial attacks becomes more and can achieve good
performance on fooling DNN models. Existing adversarial
attack methods can be divided into two categories: white-box
adversarial attack and black-box adversarial attack. White-
box attack methods need access to model’s parameters and
structure, but black-box attack methods can execute
adversarial attack with no prior knowledge about the target
model. Some typical adversarial attack methods are
introduced as follow. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM),
developed by Goodfellow et al. [4], can efficiently generate
perturbation by calculating the gradient of the loss function
with respect to the input. Deep fool algorithm proposed by
Moosavi-Dezfooli et.al [5] calculates the minimal norm
perturbation using iteration and can keep similar fooling
ratios with FGSM. Universal adversarial perturbation
computed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et.al [6] can be used on
‘any’ images with high probability for a well-trained network.
Based on generative adversarial networks [7], advGAN [8], a
feed-forward network, can even be ten times faster than
efficient FGSM after advGAN network is well-trained.
However, in some aspects, face recognition technology is
a bit different from end-to-end classification model,
extracted face features are highly concerned for building a
powerful face recognition system. Layerwise origin-target-
synthesis (LOTS) proposed by Rozsa et al. [9] demonstrates
that deep face features are even more vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. According to the strategy used in facenet
[10], face images will be embedded as high-dimensional
vectors, which represent face features for face recognition or
verification tasks. These face features will be placed in
different location in the domain which they belong to.
Proposed white-box adversarial attack methods have
shown most execution ways of generating adversarial
examples, and black-box adversarial attack methods mainly
aim at using transferability [11]. In general, larger scale of
perturbation makes adversarial attacks on face recognition
more successful but it also leads to loss of naturalness of the
perturbed face images because of the higher degree of
changes in pixel values. So the objective, for these attack
methods, is to obtain small size of perturbation and fool the
model as much as possible. So far, effective adversarial
attack methods have not been established that can deceive
the face recognition models successfully enough with
limited size of perturbation and thus with sufficient
naturalness. Figure 1 is result of FGSM experiments with
incremental epsilon (perturbation size).
Figure 1: generated samples with incremental perturbation
size and loss of naturalness
In this paper, to address this problem, emphasize the
importance of deep model security and demonstrate potential
threats to DNN-based face recognition, we explore universal
adversarial attack methods and propose an original feature-
level supportive method to further improve the performance
of existing attack methods with even reduced perturbation
size by combining with GAN [7] structure. In addition, our
proposed method is a supportive method which means it's to
improve the performance of executed attack methods but can
not implement adversarial attack, and as a feature-level
method, our proposed method is mainly based on face
features but not the origin face images, which will be
explained in proposed method part in detail.
The organization of this paper is as follows: We will
discuss the related technologies in Section II. In Section III,
we will illustrate our proposed methods and analyze the
function of each module. In Section IV, we will show the




Adversarial examples are original inputs with well-
designed perturbations, various of adversarial attack methods
have been proposed and all of them have their special
characteristics, high fooling ratio or minimal perturbation
size or efficient generation, white-box or black-box. Their
purposes are going to “push” these original samples across
the decision boundary and successfully make model believe
the perturbed inputs belong to other classes. It's a balance
and competition between perturbation size and high fooling
ratio. Figure 2 evidently shows the mechanism of adversarial
example.
Figure 2: Simple understanding of adversarial attack
b. Facenet
Facenet is an advanced face recognition system (FRS)
proposed by Florian Schroff et al. [10], it uses deep
convolutional neural network to map face images into
normalized feature vectors(usually 128-dimensional vectors),
the distances directly show the similarity of face images, face
images of same identity will have small distances and face
images of different identities will have large distances.
Facenet applies different strategy with classification task, it
removes the last softmax layer and directly trains the model
with the normalized extracted feature. Proposed triplet loss
and selected triplets (Anchor, Positive, Negative) can
increase the inter-class distances and cluster the face
embeddings. After these face embeddings are generated,
tasks like face recognition and face verification will be quite
clear and easy to execute.
c. Generative adversarial networks
In 2014, lan Goodfellow et al. [7] proposed a new deep
learning framework name generative adversarial networks
(GAN) to generate model via adversarial nets, which
becomes one of the most promising methods in complicated
unsupervised learning scenario. There are at least two
modules (generative module and discriminative module) in
the universal GAN structure and the generator can generate
very good outputs by competing with the discriminator, and
the discriminator will also get improved in this process. In
the original theory, generator and discriminator need not to
be deep neural networks, but in practical applications,
generator and discriminator will adopt two deep neutral
works. The GAN loss described in the original can be write
as the formula below:
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Based on this GAN framework, various of variations are
developed to further improve the ability for other
complicated tasks. Pix2pix proposed by Isola et al. [12] can
learn the mapping from paired data and implement image to
image translation after their conditional GAN is well-trained.
Almost at the same time, CycleGAN which is developed
from their former work: pix2pix, is proposed by Zhu et al.
[13]. Instead of the strict limitation of paired data in pix2pix,
CycleGAN can be trained with unpaired data and achieve
good quality of translated images. Different from these
existing work, we need the image to image translation
ability of CycleGAN but we also want to subtly manipulate
the outputs so that it can satisfy our purpose.
d. Center loss
Center loss is first proposed by Wen et al. [14] in 2016.
In face recognition tasks, the extracted features should be
not only separable but also easy to separate. The authors
analyzed the features learned by softmax loss and found
these features of same class are dispersed so they proposed
center loss to compact these features. Different from the
triplet loss, which is rather hard to sampling the triplets in
the training part, center loss can get rather compacted
features just with softmax loss. Figure 3 shows two kinds of
different features and the feature distributions got by
softmax loss and center loss in 2-dimensional visible space.
Separable Discriminative
features features
Softmax loss Center loss
Figure 3: Features visualizations
B. Analysis and remaining challenges
Existing methods have been concentrating on improving
or creating in the algorithm aspect, but the shortest distance
to the decision boundary has been obtained by Deepfool [5],
this means, the fooling ratio can not get better without
increasing perturbation size, limitation of perturbation size
will directly decline the performance of these methods.
The basic problem in the existing approaches is that they
try to generate adversarial examples without considering the
instance-dependent difficulty for attaining the purpose (i.e.
distance to the border). If we can pre-shift the instance
closer to the border prior to adversarial attacks, without
loosing identity, we can improve the attacking performance.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
A. Strategy
We propose to insert an image-to-image translation as a
pre-processor before conducting (any) adversarial example
generation for face recognition task.
Here, our newly proposed BiasGAN searches for the
optimal translation, through generator-detector collaboration,
starting from the original image instance, and closer to the
border but staying on the same side. Briefly speaking, our
methods will generate images with shifted feature locations.
BiasGAN is different from conventional GANs such as
CycleGAN, which will be illustrated in “Basic analysis” part.
Our proposed BiasGAN are based on image to image
translation, considering the difficulty of obtaining paired
dataset, the structure of CycleGAN will be the main
framework for this task.
Our method works well without prior knowledge on the
distribution of instances in the face domains, and thus is
generally applicable independent both of the subsequent
adversarial example generation implementation and target
face recognition (white-box attack).
In Sec4, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposal by
using it as a pre-processor to existing methods.
B. Basic analysis
1) Feature extractor
As a feature-level methods in face recognition field, a
good feature extractor is necessary. Aiming at the state-of-
the-art face recognition system, so the more powerful this
feature extractor can be, the better result can be achieved.
We train a feature extractor with both center loss and Resnet
v2 [15] based on preprocessed celeba [16] dataset.
2) Face attributes and feature location
Face images will be extracted into 128-dimensional
vectors face features (got by the result of Facenet) for face
recognition task. And in one identity domain, because of the
differences among some face attributes, these face features
locations will also be different. Using face expression as an
instance and the 2-dimension visualization is as Figure 4.
Figure 4: different face feature locations caused by different
face attributes
We can see point 2 is closest to the border and point 3 is
furthest from the border. It means, point 2 is the easiest one
to cross the border but point 3 is the hardest one.
Suppose point 1 can be shifted to point 2, it means point
1 will become easier to cross the border. This means if
executing adversarial attacks in the following step, the
performance will become better, such as Figure 5.
Figure 5: shift point 1 to point 2
Now the problem becomes an image to image translation
task.The most state-of-the-art image to image translation
technology is pix2pix [12], but the shortcoming is pix2pix
needs paired dataset which is hard to obtain.
Improved unpaired image to image translation
technology CycleGAN [13], which is proposed by the same
team, needs no paired dataset and can be as powerful as
pix2pix. But the problem is CycleGAN just concentrates on
the translation task but doesn't care about the feature
location (also appropriate for pix2pix). Figure 6 shows the
negative result of CycleGAN.
Figure 6: The face feature location of the generated image
via CycleGAN is random.
In order to satisfy the requirement, generating images
with proper face feature locations, based on the structure of
CycleGAN, we proposed BiasGAN.
C. BiasGAN
Face attributes directly decide the location of face feature
and influence the difficulty of pushing the samples across the
decision boundary, and that is also the difficulty of fooling
the model. We use GAN structure for image to image
translation task, and in view of the difficulty to get
satisfactory paired dataset, we adopt the strategy in
CycleGAN [13].
Figure 7: Flowchart of data processing
Figure 8: Structure of BiasGAN
Figure 7 is a simple data processing flowchart and figure
8 shows the structure of BiasGAN.
1) Brief explanation of the structure of BiasGAN
X and Y are two kinds of images for image to image
translation task. 1G is a generator for translating X to Y and
2G is a generator for translating Y to X. Two discriminators
XD and YD will distinguish the original true images and
generated images.Cycle consistency is proposed in the paper
of CycleGAN and it's function can be simply regard as a
constraint for 1G and 2G . The features extracted from Y
subject to two factors and these two factors will influence 1G
in turn.
2) Losses defined for generating biased face images.
Similar to one generator GAN structure, the GAN loss
for two generators GAN structure can be written as the
formula below:









In CycleGAN’s setting, an identify loss is proposed and
becomes a penalty function for the performance of generator
1G and 2G . If the images in X domain are used as the inputs
of 2G , it should remain same as the original images, which is
same with 1G . The identify loss can be written as the
formula below:










Another important penalty function is cycle loss, which is
the key point in CycleGAN’s setting. In order to avoid the
situation that all images in X domain are mapped into single
image in Y domain and all images in Y domain are mapped
into single image in X domain, overcome the weakness of
unpaired limited dataset, cycle loss is proposed and can be
defined as the formula below:










Because CycleGAN doesn't care about the feature
locations, which might cause negative result, bias loss is
originally proposed. We made this supportive method as a
FRS-independent method, which means we have no prior
knowledge about the face recognition model, we use the
distance to the class center as a metric for estimation. The
further the face feature is from the center, the closer the face
feature is to the border.





However the negative result for bias loss is that it will
give too large shift for the feature location so a guard loss is
originally proposed for this possible negative situation.
The generated images Y’ should still keep the same
identity as X, in feature level, the extracted feature F(Y’)
should still keep in the same identity domain with F(X).
Still as a FRS-independent method, we will use the
distance to the class center for estimation. If the distance to
other center is shorter than the distance to their real center,
we put a big weight for guard loss, otherwise guard loss is 0.
The defined guard loss can be written as the formula
below, xcenter is the center of current inputs, 'xcenter is
the second closest center of current inputs.
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Considering all the losses mentioned above, the objective
function for Bias GAN can be summarize as below, and
 ,, are three hyper-parameters to balance the weights.










IV. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
We conduct performance evaluation on celeba dataset,
executed two widely used adversarial attack methods FGSM
and advGAN in different parameter configurations. In order
to get satisfactory training dataset, we also did pre-
processing on celeba dataset, further aligned the face images
by face detection, then cropped face images into 160*160.
Two metrics are using to evaluate the performance of
adversarial attacks:
Fooling ratio: the percentage of images that successfully
dodge their true labels.
Size of perturbation: the average L2 norm of the
perturbations of perturbed samples which successfully fool
the model.
A. BiasGAN and face recognition model
In our experiments, we use resnet structure to build
generators and discriminators, for training the BiasGAN
model, we also set these three hyper-parameters as:
5 1 2/)100/(epochint
we hope in the beginning training stage, model will
concentrate more on generating natural images and with the
epochs becoming larger, the limitation from guard loss will
help decide the proper location of face features.
In order to differ from the structure used for feature
extractor, we apply another structure Resnet v1 [17] for face
recognition task and simply got 99.0% accuracy on 100
identities with 2000 images.
Images with biased feature will be generated via
BiasGAN, so identity and expression (smiling and neutral)
are labeled for the experiments based on celeba dataset.
Figure 9 shows examples of generated images via BiasGAN.
Figure 9: neutral images and generated images
B. AdvGAN
In advGAN, three losses are balanced by two parameters,
the objective function of advGAN can be concluded as:
hingeGANadv LLLL  
Where advL is the ability of fooling the target model,
GANL is to keep the naturalness of generated images, hingeL
limits the size of perturbation. Different from the original
paper using simple MNIST dataset, in our experiments,
celeba dataset is much larger and face recognition images are
more complicated, in order to avoid vibration and imbalance
of loss values, we use different strategy to define advL :
 )) )),(((( txGxfEL fxadv 
Where f is the target model, f is the loss function(e.g.,
cross-entropy loss) used to train the model f , t is the one-
hot label of the original image x and ))(( xGxf  is
prediction result.  is a hyper-parameter used to balance the
loss weight.
We conduct experiments by mainly changing the value of
 , because limitation of perturbation size directly decide
the shift distance in identity domain, antagonize advL and
influence the final fooling ratio.




1 95.37% 97.63% 2.26%
2 72.19% 91.86% 19.67%
3 48.82% 89.19% 40.37%
4 39.96% 86.1% 46.14%
5 38.52% 85.17% 46.65%
Table 1.1 shows the fooling ratio results of advGAN and
reveals that our proposed method can significantly improve
the fooling ratio especially when perturbation size is limited
to a low level.
Table 1. 2 Result table for advGAN experiments
beta L2 norm
L2 norm
(with bias GAN) Improvement
1 1.9023 1.8755 0.0268
2 1.1934 1.1100 0.0834
3 0.6229 0.5241 0.0988
4 0.4607 0.2184 0.2423
5 0.3643 0.1110 0.2533
Table 1.2 shows the perturbation size results of advGAN
and reveals that while keeping higher fooling ratio level, our
proposed method can also obtain smaller perturbation size
especially when perturbation size is limited to a low level.
Figure 10: fooling ratio vs L2 norm curve
Figure 10 shows the fooling ratio vs L2 norm curve of
advGAN experiments. We found significant improvement
for all perturbation range especially good in low perturbation
level. Figure 11 shows the perturbed image examples by
advGAN and advGAN with bias GAN.
Figure 11: samples of experiment result
C. FGSM
FGSM applies the sign of the gradient with respect to the
input image, and use a parameter to control the size of
perturbation, the perturbation can be written as:
)),,((* Ifsign  
We use  ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, stride is 0.1, calculate
the fooling ratios, size of perturbation and compare with the
results while combining with our proposed method.
Figure 12 shows the fooling ratio vs L2 norm curve of
FGSM experiments, and table 2 shows the fooling ratio
results of FGSM. In FGSM experiments, the value of
perturbation size is same as the value of epsilon.
Figure 12: fooling ratio vs L2 norm curve





(with bias GAN) Improvement
0.1 89.91% 94.34% 4.43%
0.2 95.98% 96.6% 0.62%
0.3 97.43% 97.63% 0.2%
0.4 98.04% 97.94% -0.1%
0.5 98.76% 98.15% -0.61%
0.6 98.87% 97.94% -0.93%
0.7 99.18% 98.04% -1.14%
0.8 99.28% 98.25% -1.03%
0.9 99.38% 98.35% -1.03%
In Figure 12, we found significant improvement in low
perturbation level but degraded performance in higher
perturbation range. This is possibly caused by the strange
high-dimensional decision boundary. Figure 13 shows the
possible reason by setting strange decision boundary in
visible 2-dimention space, in real invisible high-dimension
space, the situation will become much more complicated.
Figure 13: possible explanation in 2-dimension space
Red cluster is original sample cluster, green
cluster is generated sample cluster via Bias GAN. For
FGSM algorithm, here, the vertical line to the
decision boundary is the gradient direction. When the
perturbation is small, red cluster can only approach
the decision boundary but green cluster has already
crossed the boundary, but when the perturbation is
large, green cluster moves to class 1 but red cluster
still keeps in the space of class 2.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We explore the face feature and decision space and
propose Bias GAN as a feature-level supportive method to
improve the performance of universal adversarial attack
methods, generated biased images are more dispersed and
closer to the simulated decision boundary in extracted face
feature vector space.
We conduct experiments on celeba dataset with advGAN
and FGSM, find that the improvements are significant when
the perturbation size is limited to a low level but in FGSM
experiment we find negative improvement when the
perturbation size surpasses a threshold. Although in real
adversarial attack task, low level perturbation size is essential
and our proposed method can work well, this exception also
needs further solution, we give possible explanation in 2-
dimension space but in invisible high-dimensional space this
situation will be much more complicated and harder to
analyze.
In the future work, we will concentrate on analyzing the
decision boundary in high dimension, finding out the reason,
trying to visualize it (if possible), and eliminating the
negative improvement in condition of large perturbation size.
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